Law on Enhancing National Solidarity and Social Integration in Turkey

Political Peace or Security Management After Disarmament?

English | Kurdish | Arabic

---

Executive Summary

On August 18, 2026, the law on "Enhancing National Solidarity and Social Integration" was published in Turkey’s Official Gazette following its signing by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The law marks an important step in a process that began with Abdullah Öcalan’s call on February 27, 2025, for the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) to dissolve and abandon armed struggle, followed by the party's announcement on May 12, 2025, to dissolve its organizational structure and end the armed struggle. However, the law does not yet provide a comprehensive political settlement for the Kurdish issue.

The law regulates the suspension of investigations, trials, and the enforcement of certain sentences related to affiliation with or support for the party. However, it conditions the initiation of these mechanisms on confirmation by security institutions that the party's activity has ended and its weapons have been surrendered, followed by a decision from the National Security Council. This grants the state control over the moment of implementation and the verification of individual cases.

The paper concludes that disarmament may reduce violence and open space for civil life, but it does not automatically equal peace. The absence of political recognition, failure to address counter-terrorism laws, continued ambiguity surrounding Öcalan's status, and the decline of the Kurdish military and administrative presence in Syria all make the process in its current phase closer to organized security management than to political reconciliation and transitional justice.

Key Findings

• The law is conditional and temporary, not a comprehensive general amnesty.

• The Turkish gain is clear and immediate: ending the armed threat; whereas the political quid pro quo for the Kurds remains undefined.

• Imbalances in military and regional power pushed both sides to accept the peace process.

• The Turkish incentive combines regional security, reducing economic attrition, and internal calculations related to the future of Erdoğan and the opposition.

• Transforming disarmament into peace requires constitutional recognition, social, cultural, and political rights, actionable decentralization, and an economic program for the Kurdish regions.

Scope and Methodology of the Paper

This paper relies on three interconnected levels of information: published legal facts in the Official Gazette, reliable press coverage, and information obtained from private sources via direct contact with individuals and leaders connected to the process at various levels. These sources helped clarify aspects not appearing in official statements, particularly communications related to the process involving the PKK, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and Abdullah Öcalan. The paper builds upon these data points to provide a political reading of the Turkish and regional context, while maintaining source confidentiality and distinguishing between published information and directly acquired data.

Brief Historical Background

The roots of the Kurdish issue in Turkey date back to the founding of the republic on a centralized nationalist basis that long treated Kurdish identity as a security matter or a threat to state unity. This policy was accompanied by restrictions on language and political organization, followed by uprisings, and widespread military suppression. The PKK was founded in the late 1970s and launched its armed struggle in 1984, transforming the conflict into one of the longest armed conflicts in the region.

Turkey witnessed intermittent phases of openness and dialogue, most notably the 2013–2015 process. That process allowed direct contacts and promises of reforms, but it collapsed amid escalating violence, regional tensions, and internal polarization. The collapse left a profound impact on Kurdish trust, leaving any new initiative facing a practical question: What guarantees prevent the rapid transition from negotiation back to repression?

Therefore, the current law cannot be read in isolation from previous political memory. The law may be more advanced than a mere security declaration, but it will remain limited unless transformed into a stable framework linking disarmament to clear political and rights-based reforms.

What Do We Learn from the 2013–2015 Process?

The previous peace process offers a fundamental lesson. Political contacts alone are not enough when commitments are not mutual and legally protected. The previous process opened space for dialogue, but remained fragile in the face of security shifts, elections, and developments in Syria. When it collapsed, both sides returned to the logic of force, pushing Kurdish cities into confrontations that caused widespread losses and closed civic space.

The second lesson is that ambiguity may help leaders start negotiations, but it harms the legitimacy of the process in the long run. If Kurdish society does not know what it will receive, and Turkish society does not know what the state will commit to, each side can interpret the process as a concession by the other. Therefore, the current law needs an announced timetable and implementation indicators that parliament, the judiciary, and public opinion can review.

The third lesson is that the internal track is inseparable from the regional one. The Syrian war, the expansion of cross-border Kurdish influence, and Turkish military interventions have all affected Ankara's and the party's calculations alike. Consequently, any new agreement requires communication channels with Baghdad, Erbil, Damascus, Tehran, and Washington to prevent poor regional coordination from torpedoing the internal understanding.

1. What Does the Law Regulate?

Conditional Legal Treatment Rather Than a General Amnesty

The law does not grant a general amnesty in the traditional sense. Instead, it establishes a temporary system to suspend investigations, trials, and the enforcement of certain sentences related to membership, support, propaganda, or financing. Procedures can be suspended for specified periods, then dropped if the individual complies with conditions and commits no new crimes during the prescribed period. Coverage indicates that thousands of persons may benefit from this mechanism, especially those who did not directly participate in acts of violence.

However, the activation of sentences is not automatic. First, Turkish security institutions must confirm the actual end of the party's presence and the handover of weapons under its control, followed by a decision from the National Security Council verifying this and published in the Official Gazette. Only after this step does the deadline for submitting application requests begin. Thus, the state retains the decisive role in verification, determining the timing of implementation, and evaluating individual cases.

Who Falls Outside the Law?

The law excludes those convicted of intentional murder, alongside categories of life-sentence prisoners, including PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and several senior commanders. The legislation does not alter Öcalan's legal status nor automatically open a path to his release, despite his central role in calling for a solution and ending armed struggle. Nor does it directly address political and cultural rights, the amendment of counter-terrorism laws, or the expansion of peaceful Kurdish political space.

Postponing these dossiers remains a source of uncertainty. If the disarmament mechanism is not followed by measurable political steps, the first phase could turn into the final phase of the process.

2. The Rhetorical Gap and the Absent Recognition

The core of the problem is that the Turkish state has not yet acknowledged that its discriminatory and racist nationalist policies toward the Kurds were the primary factor in producing the environment from which the conflict arose and paving the way for the emergence of the PKK. It is improper to place the state, with all its institutions, authority, and decision-making power, on an equal footing with an organization that emerged in a context of oppression and denial. The original responsibility for the outbreak of the conflict lies with the state and its policies, whereas the PKK bears no responsibility for those policies that generated the crisis. This does not absolve the party of responsibility for violations and attacks it subsequently committed, but it does not turn those violations into the cause of the conflict, nor does it exempt the state from its historical and political responsibility. Official rhetoric still tends to present what happened as a one-sided terrorist crisis rather than a conflict entailing state responsibility, institutional actions, and discriminatory policies.

Therefore, the process looks closer to a security path for re-containment than to peace built on reconciliation and transitional justice. The legislation regulates the status of party individuals, but includes no clear recognition of the victims of state policies, no accountability for violations committed during decades of conflict, and no institutional guarantees of non-recurrence.

Nor does it explicitly recognize the existence of a Kurdish issue independent of the PKK's existence. This is a central point because the Kurdish issue preceded the party and will not end simply with its dissolution. Here, a fundamental gap emerges between the rhetoric of both parties: the Kurdish movement speaks of identity, language, rights, and political representation, while the state deals with an organization it classified as terrorist that decided to dissolve itself, establishing a legal mechanism for its return and containment.

If this discrepancy remains unaddressed, the party may end while the issue that contributed to its emergence persists. The state may succeed in removing arms from the equation without transitioning to a reconciliation that addresses the roots of the conflict.

3. Kurdish Society and the Crisis of Legitimacy

The current stance of Kurdish public opinion cannot be understood through the ideology upon which the PKK was founded. The party arose within the context of the revolutionary left in the 1970s, presenting itself as a social liberation movement with a leftist project. Today, however, the priorities of wide segments of Kurds have changed. A large part of the new generation has moved away from traditional leftist rhetoric and shifted toward a Kurdish national discourse focusing on identity, rights, local governance, and political representation.

The Rojava experience and the experience of Iraqi Kurdistan (*Bashur*) have contributed to raising expectations. Kurds no longer view themselves as a deprived group awaiting minimal recognition, but rather as a political, military, and societal force capable of managing their regions and participating in shaping their future. Therefore, demands are no longer limited to cultural recognition or limited permission to use the language, but include running Kurdish regions through elected local institutions, guaranteeing language, education, and culture, securing political, economic, and social rights, and perhaps some form of self-rule within the state.

This shift presents the Turkish government and the PKK with a shared challenge. The government fears that recognizing these demands will redefine the state and its relationship with the Kurds, while the party itself faces the prospect of losing part of its popular base if its discourse remains confined to revolutionary leftism and armed struggle at a time when Kurdish society leans more toward a practical national discourse focusing on institutions, rights, and governance.

The discontent within Kurdish public opinion in Bakur is not limited to the repression faced by the Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) but is also linked to the party's own performance in recent years. Criticisms have mounted due to its positions on the peace process, its political errors, and its inability to confront the state or effectively mobilize the public. A section of the Kurds believes the party made political concessions without securing corresponding guarantees and failed to transform its parliamentary and municipal representation into a pressure force capable of protecting Kurdish rights.

The arrest of first- and second-tier leaders and mayors has exacerbated this crisis, transferring vital roles to third-tier leaders, which weakened political and organizational decision-making. Therefore, a large segment of Kurdish society does not view DEM as a strong representative of its demands in the current phase but holds it partly responsible for the political paralysis accompanying the peace process. This explains why the acceptance of the current path by some leaders does not signify broad popular acceptance of it.

Thus, the PKK may end as a military and organizational structure, but this does not mean the project will end as a political ideology, nor does it mean Kurdish society will automatically accept the proposed terms. Emerging from these experiences, Kurdish society demands more than the reintegration of individuals; it demands the redefinition of the relationship between the Turkish state and the Kurds on the basis of recognition, rights, and political partnership.

4. The Regional Incentive: Securing Turkey's Interior

Ankara's openness to the PKK cannot be separated from the transformations that began after the October 7, 2023 attack, followed by the war in Gaza, regional conflicts, and profound changes in Syria and Iraq. These developments heightened Turkey's concerns over the reshaped region and the potential for expanding conflict or Iranian instability.

From the perspective of Turkish national security, the Kurdish issue—due to its span across Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran—can turn into a point of vulnerability ripe for exploitation in regional conflicts. Any external power wishing to pressure another state typically looks for internal divisions or conflicts that can be exploited. The party's persistence without a resolution leaves the door open for interventions and alliances that Ankara may not be able to control in the future.

Accordingly, the current path can be read as an attempt to fortify Turkey's interior while simultaneously removing an armed threat and a regional card. This does not mean the security motive cancels out the possibility of reaching peace, but it implies that the state's initiative may be driven primarily by mitigating regional risks rather than resulting so far from a comprehensive internal reassessment of its policies toward the Kurds.

5. The Economic Factor and Stopping the Attrition

The process is not only tied to security and regional calculations, but also to Turkey's economic situation. Long military operations in Northern, Southern, and Western Kurdistan imposed ongoing financial and security costs at a time when the country faces inflation, currency pressures, and a declining capacity to sustain open-ended attrition. From this angle, ending the armed conflict could allow for reduced military spending, improved investment and trade environments, and the channeling of resources toward the domestic economy.

These calculations are also linked to Turkey's position as a bridge between Europe and Asia and a corridor for energy and trade. However, transforming Turkey into a stable regional node requires reducing risks along border regions, including Iraq and Syria. Therefore, Ankara may see settling the Kurdish file as a way to reduce a security cost that impedes its economic ambitions, rather than merely making a political concession to the Kurdish movement.

Yet this gain will not materialize automatically. It depends on whether the state will use the resources freed up by the cessation of fighting to address economic disparities, or settle for converting financial savings into new security and regional tools.

6. Erdoğan, the Opposition, and the Future of Turkey's Role

The disarmament track is also intertwined with the struggle over the future of Turkey's political system. Since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, extensive powers have concentrated in the presidency, and political competition has gradually transformed into a struggle over the very nature of the state. In recent years, opposition figures and elected mayors, most notably Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, have faced judicial measures and arrests. Furthermore, a Turkish court in May 2026 annulled the results of the Republican People's Party (CHP) congress, sidelined Özgür Özel, and reinstated Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu to the party leadership. Kılıçdaroğlu is viewed as electorally weak, having lost all elections he contested against the AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and his past leadership weakened the party and its competitiveness. The opposition described the judicial ruling as political interference aimed at weakening the largest rival of the ruling coalition, which includes the AKP and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).

In this context, the peace process can be read as part of a broader attempt to rearrange the electoral map. The CHP benefited from Kurdish votes in municipal elections, managing to wrest Istanbul and Ankara from the AKP. Consequently, the government may seek to secure Kurdish support and prevent the formation of a political or electoral alliance between them and the CHP, thereby weakening the opposition's ability to build a broad electoral base capable of competing with the ruling coalition.

If the process succeeds, it could lead to understandings between the government and Kurdish forces while simultaneously preventing the formation of an electoral front gathering the CHP and Kurdish parties. Thus, disarmament becomes part of a broader political strategy aimed at securing Kurdish votes, weakening the Republican Party, and reproducing the electoral balance in favor of Erdoğan and his allies.

7. Turkish Foreign Policy Between Expansion, Blackmail, and Repositioning

Erdoğan's foreign policy was not merely a policy to protect Turkish security, but took on a clear expansionist character, driven by an ambition to rebuild extensive Turkish influence in regions Ankara considers part of its historical and strategic sphere. The Turkish government dealt with Syria, Iraq, the Caucasus, and Libya as open arenas for intervention, not just neighboring states. In this context, Erdoğan's rhetoric was linked to the idea of reviving the "Neo-Ottomanism" model, justifying that protecting Turkey and its interests requires expanding its political and military sphere beyond its borders.

Turkey translated this vision into direct military occupation of areas in northern Syria, the establishment of military sites inside Iraqi territory, and intervention in the Azerbaijan-Armenia war. In Libya, it did not stop at political and military support, but dispatched Syrian fighters and mercenaries from factions affiliated with the so-called Syrian National Army. It also used the refugee file to pressure the European Union by threatening to open or close borders, securing billions of euros under European-Turkish understandings to fund refugee hosting, with allocations for the "Refugee Facility in Turkey" reaching about six billion euros (European Commission).

Simultaneously, Ankara pursued a pragmatic policy of playing among international contradictions: it is a NATO member and Western partner, yet it simultaneously developed close relations with Russia, capitalizing on the war in Ukraine and Russian-Western rivalry to strengthen its bargaining position. If Erdoğan and the ruling coalition remain in power, this approach is likely to continue, utilizing the termination of the Kurdish conflict to solidify bases and influence in Syria and Iraq. Conversely, if the opposition comes to power, it might ease military intervention and rearrange relations based on good neighborliness, economics, and diplomacy, without necessarily abandoning the influence Turkey accumulated over the past two decades.

8. The Imbalance of Power and the Timing Paradox

The party's decision cannot be separated from the major shift in the balance of power. For years, it has been unable to carry out effective military operations inside Turkey due to geopolitical changes and the development of military hardware such as drones, surveillance systems, and intelligence, in addition to Turkish operations that pushed most of its activity outside Turkish territory.

Developments in Syria brought the party back to the forefront of regional attention, especially after the rise of the People's Protection Units (YPG) and their role in the war against the Islamic State (ISIS) within the international coalition. The PKK also consolidated its presence in Sinjar following the atrocities committed by ISIS against the Yazidis. This role in Syria granted it military and political importance, opening a space for alliances with Washington and the West.

However, this equation later shifted. The military and administrative presence of the Autonomous Administration project declined, and the SDF faced mounting pressure to integrate into Syrian state institutions. Furthermore, the PKK's presence in the Kurdistan Region became a burden on the party itself, the regional government, and the Iraqi state, as it provides Turkey with a continuous pretext for military and political intervention in Iraq and Syria.

In this sense, the party can no longer sustain its previous status. It lacks sufficient military efficacy to impose negotiating terms, while its presence is used to justify pressure on the Rojava and Kurdistan Region experiments. Therefore, the decision to dissolve, alongside the political review, reflects the shrinking military and regional options available to the party.

This does not mean disarmament is a mistake. Armed struggle was no longer capable of producing a sustainable political solution. But the timing of the transition defines its terms: Ankara secures the most obvious gain from the outset—ending the armed threat—while Kurdish political gains remain undefined and unsecured.

9. Syria and the Shrinkage of the Autonomous Administration Project

The SDF entered a military and administrative integration process with Damascus after losing a large portion of its areas of control during the early 2026 clashes. Reports indicate a trend toward integrating military formations and civil institutions affiliated with the Autonomous Administration into Syrian state institutions, while certain local details and cultural rights remain subject to negotiation.

There is insufficient public evidence to describe these developments as an official clause in a single deal between Turkey and the PKK. Yet it is also difficult to view them as a completely separate path, because Ankara considers the SDF an extension of the party and has made its integration into the Syrian state a fixed pillar in its regional calculations.

It should not be claimed that Abdullah Öcalan publicly issued a direct directive regarding every detail of the agreement unless a published text proving this becomes available.

However, according to informed sources we contacted, communications took place between SDF leaders—foremost among them Mazloum Abdi and Ilham Ahmed—and Öcalan, and these communications helped facilitate understandings with Damascus.

This information indicates that Öcalan played a role in pushing toward acceptance of the agreement at a time when the SDF was divided between a faction rejecting extensive concessions and a faction believing continued confrontation would lead to the loss of what remains of the political and military sphere. The DEM party also contributed to facilitating contacts through visits to Rojava and carrying messages between parties.

Other data indicates that the Kurdistan Region of Iraq played a role in mediation and providing political guarantees after the SDF's options shrank and solo negotiations with Damascus and Turkey became difficult. This does not mean an announced, unified deal exists among all parties, but it reveals the network of regional pressures and mediations surrounding the agreement.

Moreover, any decision to withdraw or integrate does not guarantee that all PKK elements will abide by it in the same manner. In earlier stages, groups within the party emerged that refused withdrawal, chose to continue resistance, or failed to adhere to the party's political choices. Such resistance may be militarily limited, but it holds symbolic and political value that the party can leverage.

10. Historical Memory and the Crisis of Trust

Present in Kurdish memory is the Misak-ı Millî (National Pact), embodied in the participation of certain Kurdish clans alongside the Kemalist movement during the War of Independence and the foundation of the republic, followed by the state's subsequent retreat from the partnership rhetoric toward a centralized nationalism that denied Kurdish distinctiveness. Regardless of historical differences in interpreting promises and understandings accompanying that phase, a sense became deeply rooted among many Kurds that they contributed to founding the state only to be excluded from its official definition.

Furthermore, the collapse of the peace process between 2013 and 2015 reinforces fears of repeating the experience. Therefore, statements or verbal understandings are insufficient to convince Kurdish public opinion that abandoning weapons will be met with a genuine political transformation.

A section of the Kurds feels that the current process resembles conditions imposed on a party that lost a war, even though it was not officially declared as surrender. What is demanded of the Kurdish side is clear and immediate: dissolving the organization, surrendering weapons, and submitting to verification mechanisms. Meanwhile, state commitments related to recognition, rights, and political reform remain vague or delayed.

11. Conditions for Actual Recognition

Recognition of Kurds merely as individual citizens or a demographic mass within the republic is insufficient. What is required is recognition of them as a historical community with an identity, language, culture, and geographic presence.

Thus far, official rhetoric and the new law have not reached this level. The state remains hesitant to use terms like "the Kurdish issue" and "Kurdistan" in official political discourse, and explicit constitutional recognition of Kurdish identity and collective rights has not been achieved.

Durable peace requires a clear discussion on constitutional recognition of Kurdish identity, guaranteeing socio-cultural, economic, and political rights, protecting peaceful political action, and respecting elected local administrations.

Nor should autonomy or decentralization remain political taboos. Turkey is not fundamentally an overly centralized state, and expanding the powers of local administrations can be a tool to reinforce state unity, not an automatic step toward its partition. Demanding broad local rule or autonomy should not be treated as synonymous with partition if organized constitutionally within the borders and sovereignty of the state.

12. Economy and Local Justice

Northern Kurdistan (eastern and southeastern Turkey) has suffered for decades from economic and developmental disparities compared to western regions. The continuation of conflict, centralized policies, and weak local population participation in decision-making have perpetuated these disparities. Economic incentive packages also failed to achieve sustainable results when presented as a substitute for political and social reform.

Therefore, any serious settlement requires a long-term economic program co-designed by local administrations, civil society, business owners, and regional residents. Peace does not mean a mere ceasefire; it also means reducing disparities in education, health, infrastructure, employment, and investment opportunities. Without economic justice, marginalization may persist even if the armed organization ends.

13. Post-Disarmament Tests

The law represents a real opportunity to reduce violence and reintegrate thousands of people into civil life. However, disarmament does not automatically equal peace. The practical tests are as follows:

• Legal Clarity: Measurable guarantees and an independent, understandable verification mechanism, rather than rules subject to changing administrative interpretations.

• Political Space: Protecting peaceful participation, expression, and political competition, without placing Kurdish activity under security suspicion.

• Detainees and Öcalan Dossier: Addressing non-violence-related cases within a clear legal and political track.

• Constitutional and Cultural Rights: Recognizing language and identity and guaranteeing education, culture, and political representation.

• Local Governance and Economy: Expanding the powers of elected administrations and linking peace to a long-term development program.

• Regional Consistency: Preventing the use of the Kurdish file to justify permanent interventions in Iraq and Syria, and respecting the interests of the Kurdistan Region and Rojava.

  
  

14. Positions and Interests of the Parties

The Turkish government enters the process from a position focusing on sovereignty, security, and preventing the return of attacks. It wants a controllable mechanism, not an agreement granting the party equal political recognition with the state. Conversely, the Kurdish side wants disarmament to translate into recognition of rights and a political space ensuring the non-reproduction of repression under new titles.

As for the DEM party, it attempts to maintain its role as a political channel between Öcalan, the government, and Kurdish public opinion, but operates within a heavily pressured electoral and judicial environment. The SDF and the Rojava administration move under different pressures: preserving as much local governance as possible, preventing the return of war, and negotiating with Damascus from a position that does not grow weaker.

The Kurdistan Region seeks a difficult balance between protecting Kurdish rights in Western Kurdistan and its relations with Ankara and Baghdad, while safeguarding its internal security and economic interests.

The PKK's continued presence in the Kurdistan Region places it under Turkish and Iraqi pressure, whereas a mediation role might allow it to maintain regional Kurdish influence and avoid wider confrontation.

15. Potential Scenarios

1. The First Scenario (Gradual Settlement):The party commits to disarmament, and the state responds with successive legal and political steps including freedoms, rights, and decentralization. This scenario requires a mutual verification mechanism, an announced timetable, and protection of the process from electoral shifts.

   
   

2. The Second Scenario (Short-Term Successful Security Management): Violence drops and a number of members return to civil life, but no political reform occurs. This scenario may look stable, but it leaves the causes of the conflict intact and makes the return of the crisis possible at the first internal or regional shock.

   
   

3. The Third Scenario (Disorderly Disintegration): Groups within the party reject the settlement, integration arrangements in Syria fail, or the government uses legal ambiguity against Kurdish activity. In this case, the party's centralized capacity may recede, but new forms of resistance or political protest will emerge.

   
   

The likelihood of any of these scenarios depends on three variables: the clarity of the political quid pro quo, the government's ability to control its apparatus and judicial institutions, and Kurdish forces' capacity to maintain unified civilian representation that the state does not push back into the security domain.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Available indicators tilt the scale toward "security management" over "political settlement" in the current phase. The state has secured its most obvious gain—ending the armed threat and changing its surrounding regional environment—before committing to a time-bound or legally defined political quid pro quo. This does not mean the law is unimportant, or that achieving peace is impossible, but it means the meaning of the law will be determined by the steps that follow.

This tilt can be reversed through subsequent legislation regarding Kurdish language and education, an effective amendment to the counter-terrorism law expanding peaceful political space, a tangible move on the Öcalan and detainees dossier, and an actionable decentralization and economic development program. The absence of these steps, however, will mean the law is the ceiling of what the state intends to offer, not the floor for a broader settlement.

To transform the process into a sustainable peace policy, the paper proposes five steps:

1. Establish an independent verification committee including representatives from parliament, the judiciary, and civil society.

2. Publish criteria for benefiting from the law and its decisions transparently.

3. Open a separate parliamentary track to discuss constitutional and cultural rights.

4. Protect elected municipalities and local administrations from arbitrary dismissal.

5. Link reduced military spending to an announced development program for conflict-affected regions.

These steps should also be accompanied by a regional dialogue mechanism with Baghdad, Erbil, and Damascus so that the dissolution of the party in Turkey does not shift the crisis to other borders.

The question is no longer whether the disarmament law is important. The question is whether Turkey will consider it the beginning of a process based on recognition, reconciliation, and justice, or the end of the process once it secures disarmament and fortifies its internal and regional security.